Illegal waste disposal: Enforcement actions and decentralized environmental policy
Alessio D'Amato (),
Massimiliano Mazzanti (),
Francesco Nicolli () and
Mariangela Zoli ()
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2018, vol. 64, issue C, 56-65
Environmental non-compliance is affected by the decentralized shaping of environmental policy by local governments and enforcement actions by public bodies. Illegal waste disposal is examined in a relevant national case, by means of an original regionally disaggregated panel dataset for Italy, a country which witnesses heterogeneous environmental performances across regions and a decentralized policy system. Our empirical analysis produces two main insights of strong policy interest. First, commitment to a more stringent waste policy tends to increase illegal disposal of waste. Second, a nonlinear bell shaped relationship exists between the number of inspections and the quantity of illegal disposal. The key message is that deterrence might only result after a relatively high level of controls is implemented.
Keywords: Illegal disposal; Enforcement; Inspections; Regional settings; Decentralized management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceps:v:64:y:2018:i:c:p:56-65
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