Maximizing political vote in multiple districts
H.A. Eiselt and
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2020, vol. 72, issue C
This paper models a resource allocation problem in the political context. Voters and political candidates of two parties are positioned in each of n given electoral districts. We assume that each voter will vote for the candidate he is more attracted to. This attraction is modeled by an attraction function. Each of the parties now attempts to allocate a finite budget to maximize their objective, which is either the popular vote or the number of districts, in which the party has a majority. Individual scenarios are examined with respect to leader-follower solutions and Nash equilibria. The paper then describes a dynamic model that successively allocates existing funds plus additional donations to candidates in different electoral districts.
Keywords: Campaign financing; Resource allocation; Political model; Nash equilibria; von stackelberg solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceps:v:72:y:2020:i:c:s0038012119304367
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