Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption? An empirical evidence

Bernardino Benito (), María-Dolores Guillamón, Ana-María Ríos and Francisco Bastida

Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 2018, vol. 21, issue 1, 19-27

Abstract: This paper mainly focuses on decisions taken by politicians that may affect the level of municipal corruption. Specifically, we study whether local politicians’ incentives to be corrupt are influenced by the wages they receive and/or their intention to run for next elections. This issue has hardly been empirically tackled before at local level.

Keywords: Wages; Re-election; Politicians; Corruption; Local government; Salarios; Reelección; Políticos; Corrupción; Gobierno municipal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:spacre:v:21:y:2018:i:1:p:19-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.rcsar.2017.04.003

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