Earnings informativeness and institutional investors on boards
Emma García-Meca and
Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 2018, vol. 21, issue 1, 73-81
We study the role of directors appointed by banks and those appointed by investment funds in the informativeness of accounting earnings in a low investor protection environment with a high presence of institutional directors. Results suggest that the monitoring role of directors appointed by banks and funds improves investor protection and increases market confidence in accounting information. The paper has interesting academic and policy implications for the debate on the proper degree of institutional involvement in corporate governance, noting that when analyzing the role of institutional investors, researchers must take into account investors’ participation in other mechanisms of corporate control such as the board of directors. We contribute to the literature by showing that, in a weak regulatory and low investor protection environment, one of the ways in which institutional investors play a monitoring role is through influencing earnings quality when they are both shareholders and board members.
Keywords: Institutional directors; Banks; Investment funds; Earnings informativeness; Consejeros institucionales; Bancos; Fondos de inversión; Capacidad informativa de los resultados contables (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 G34 M41 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:spacre:v:21:y:2018:i:1:p:73-81
Access Statistics for this article
Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review is currently edited by BernabÃ© Escobar PÃ©rez
More articles in Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().