Generalized n-Paul paradox

Péter Kevei

Statistics & Probability Letters, 2007, vol. 77, issue 11, 1043-1049

Abstract: The paradoxical results of Csörgo and Simons for mutually beneficial sharing among any fixed number of St. Petersburg gamblers are extended to games played by a possibly biased coin, with p as the probability of 'heads.' The extension is not straightforward because, unlike in the classical case with p=1/2, admissibly pooled winnings generally fail to stochastically dominate individual ones for more than two gamblers. Best admissible pooling strategies are determined when p is rational, and the algebraic depth of the problem for an irrational p is illustrated by an example.

Keywords: Generalized; St.; Petersburg; games; Comparison; of; infinite; expectations; Pooling; strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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