Consultative democracy and trust11We thank Vanessa Carrillo, Jairo Paéz and Daniel Reyes for their help during the experiments. A special thanks to Franci Beltrán, Jairo Paéz and Alfonso Peña for providing locations to run the fieldwork. Laura Jimenez thanks Fondazione “Roberto Franceschi” for the Financial Support. We thank also ASGAJUNIN for the financial support for the fieldwork in Junín. We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for their comments that helped us improving the previous version of this work. The usual disclaimer applies
Francesco Bogliacino (),
Laura Jiménez Lozano and
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2018, vol. 44, issue C, 55-67
We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most “appropriate” plan of action for individuals involved in a “Trust Game”. The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline condition where no voting takes place.
Keywords: Experiments; Trust; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 C9 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:streco:v:44:y:2018:i:c:p:55-67
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