Evolutionary effects of non-compliant behavior in public procurement

Serena Brianzoni, Raffaella Coppier and Elisabetta Michetti

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2019, vol. 51, issue C, 106-118

Abstract: The main goal of the present work is to analyze the evolution of non-compliant firms in public procurement. The dynamic setting is formalized by an evolutionary adaptation process which describes whether honest or dishonest behavior prevails in society at any given time. Firms will either behave in an honest or dishonest way depending on the payoffs and the type of firms they meet, through a word-of-mouth process. The honesty propensity assumption is introduced. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical techniques, we show that monomorphic configurations may represent stable or unstable equilibria, while coexistence of both groups in the steady state is possible and its asymptotic stability is sensitive to parameter modifications. Moreover, a rich variety of integrated dynamic behavior can be observed due to different kinds of bifurcations, smooth or border collision. A social planner can evaluate social and/or fiscal policies to manipulate preferences for honest behavior.

Keywords: Complex dynamics; Multiple equilibria; Procurement; Word of mouth; Evolutionary game; Non-compliant behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C63 C73 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X19300682
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:streco:v:51:y:2019:i:c:p:106-118

DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2019.08.008

Access Statistics for this article

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics is currently edited by F. Duchin, H. Hagemann, M. Landesmann, R. Scazzieri, A. Steenge and B. Verspagen

More articles in Structural Change and Economic Dynamics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().