Competition and social objectives: The case of West German telecommunications

Karl-Heinz Neumann and Bernhard Wieland

Telecommunications Policy, 1986, vol. 10, issue 2, 121-131

Abstract: This article discusses the problems which arise if liberalization in telecommunications has to be brought about under strong equity constraints. It is shown that, under West Germany's political framework, the average consumer exerts a much larger influence on telecommunications policy than in, for example, the USa. Distributional concerns therefore play a major role in German telecommunications policy. A strategy is presented which satisfies these equity constraints. The main elements are: (a) to keep the monopoly on the network level; (b) to allow service competition; but (c) only under a regime of 'harmonized tarrifs'.

Date: 1986
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