Telecommunications services in France: The regulated monopoly and the challenge of competition

Jean Pierre Coustel

Telecommunications Policy, 1986, vol. 10, issue 3, 229-244

Abstract: Classical microeconomic modelling cannot alone explain the present trend of telecommunications deregulation. Based upon an examination of the French situation, the author argues that the current phenomenon should be viewed more as a game between three main players whose behaviour can be analysed using principles of industrial organization. The traditional telecommunications monopoly is bound to react defensively in response to increasingly powerful demand, stimulated by technical innovations, while at the same time the public policy maker searches for modern regulatory principles. Demand, as represented by large corporate customers, will probably trigger the next step in the game between the three players.

Date: 1986
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