Cable television and competition: Theory, evidence and policy

Stanford L. Levin and John B. Meisel

Telecommunications Policy, 1991, vol. 15, issue 6, 519-528

Abstract: There is currently widespread discussion in the USA of the merits of amending legislation to allow competition in the cable television market, notably from the telecommunications companies. This article explores what economic theory can contribute to this debate, and adduces empirical evidence on the effects of competition in the cable market where it presently exists. The authors conclude that blocking entry into cable, and indeed into telecommunications markets, is likely to be poor policy, and that increased competition would foster the development of an efficient modern broadband network.

Date: 1991
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