Dominance, nondominance and the public interest in telecommunications regulation

John R. Haring and Dennis L. Weisman

Telecommunications Policy, 1993, vol. 17, issue 2, 98-106

Abstract: The competitive experiment in the US telecommunications industry has been characterized by asymmetric regulation, by which is meant a non-uniformity in the rules that apply to marketplace entrants vis-à-vis the market incumbent. Two distinct stages of asymmetric regulation can be identified historically: 'competitor necessity' and 'competitive necessity' regulation. The authors recommend adoption of 'customer necessity' regulation, wherein the focus is on maximizing economic welfare rather than the welfare of competitors.

Date: 1993
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