EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Why auction the spectrum?

John McMillan

Telecommunications Policy, 1995, vol. 19, issue 3, 191-199

Abstract: Of the alternative spectrum allocation methods -- administrative process, lottery, first come first served, and auction -- economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning works best. As well as raising revenue, an auction assigns licenses to the firms best able to use them. Also the auction can be designed to advance public policy goals such as avoiding monopoly and directing licenses to minority-owned firms.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/030859619400021J
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:telpol:v:19:y:1995:i:3:p:191-199

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30471/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... /30471/bibliographic

Access Statistics for this article

Telecommunications Policy is currently edited by Erik Bohlin

More articles in Telecommunications Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:19:y:1995:i:3:p:191-199