Why auction the spectrum?
Telecommunications Policy, 1995, vol. 19, issue 3, 191-199
Of the alternative spectrum allocation methods -- administrative process, lottery, first come first served, and auction -- economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning works best. As well as raising revenue, an auction assigns licenses to the firms best able to use them. Also the auction can be designed to advance public policy goals such as avoiding monopoly and directing licenses to minority-owned firms.
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