Beyond spectrum auctions. Taking the next step to open spectrum access

Eli Noam

Telecommunications Policy, 1997, vol. 21, issue 5, 461-475

Abstract: While the current system of auctioning exclusive licences may be the best way to allocate new frequencies for today, spectrum auctions may soon become technologically obsolete, economically inefficient, and legally unconstitutional. An alternative is to step beyond the current paradigm of licensed exclusivity to a system of full openness of entry. This would allow access to spectrum bands through access fees that are determined by demand and supply conditions at the time. Prices for access would vary, depending on congestion. Long-term access at a certain price could be obtained by using a futures market. Such a system converts fixed costs of entry into marginal costs of usage, and removes incentives for collusive pricing.

Date: 1997
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