Spectrum limits and competition in mobile markets: the role of licence fees

Harald Gruber

Telecommunications Policy, 2001, vol. 25, issue 1-2, 59-70

Abstract: The paper discusses the impact of scarcity of frequency spectrum on the performance of the mobile telecommunications industry. An oligopoly model with endogenous sunk costs illustrates the trade off between ex ante extraction of oligopoly rents and market entry of firms. The determination of the licence fee through an auction provides scope for setting market structure endogenously: the higher the licence fee, the lower the number of firms sustained by the market. High licence fees may be a signal for post-entry collusion. Differences across national regulatory frameworks with respect to the conditions for allocation of spectrum licenses may induce problems of fair competition in an integrated market.

Keywords: Mobile; telecommunications; Licence; fees; Spectrum; auction; Market; structures; competition; Post-entry; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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