How access pricing and entry interact

Martin Cave and Ingo Vogelsang

Telecommunications Policy, vol. 27, issue 10-11, 717-727

Abstract: The paper reviews the preceeding theoretical and econometric analysis, and the case study of the Netherlands. It suggests that entrants' strategies will be influenced by the level of access prices and on the degree of investment in infrastructure which entrants have to make to be eligible to purchase interconnection services at wholesale prices. Entrants will typically invest first in replicable assets, and then progress to less replicable ones--although this will also depend upon their initial endowments. This suggests that entry may best be encouraged initially by low access prices, with those prices possibly increasing over time as assets are replicated.

Keywords: Access; pricing; Facilities-based; competition; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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