On the design and implementation of the GSM auction in Nigeria--the world's first ascending clock spectrum auction

Chris Doyle and Paul McShane

Telecommunications Policy, vol. 27, issue 5-6, 383-405

Abstract: In late 1999 the Government of Nigeria decided to issue no more than four new digital mobile telephony licences. An attempt was made to award these licences using a comparative selection process, which failed due to allegations of corruption. In March 2000 it was decided that the licences would be assigned by auction, which was regarded by the government as less susceptible to corruptive influences. In January 2001 Nigeria awarded three GSM spectrum licences using an auction design that incorporated an ascending clock phase. This paper describes the design of the auction and its implementation, and seeks to draw lessons from the experience.

Keywords: Ascending; clock; auction; Auction; Comparative; selection; Design; Nigeria; Policy; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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