Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

Macro Alderighi

Telecommunications Policy, 2008, vol. 32, issue 6, 381-387

Abstract: This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545-564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1-37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.

Keywords: Non-linear; access; charges; Conjectural; variations; Telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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