Regulating a monopoly with universal service obligations: The role of flexible tariff schemes

Manuel Willington and Jorge Li Ning Chaman

Telecommunications Policy, 2014, vol. 38, issue 1, 32-48

Abstract: This paper's purpose is to study the problem of a utility monopoly's regulator, which has a universal service goal that is binding, in the sense that there is no two-part tariff that can induce efficient consumption, self-finance the firm, and guarantee universal access at the same time.

Keywords: Monopoly regulation; Network utilities; Universal service obligation; Non-linear tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Regulating a Monopoly with Universal Service Obligation: The Role of Flexible Tariff Schemes (2009)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2013.04.005

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