The affiliation agreement in US broadcasting: The tie that binds

Barry R. Litman

Telecommunications Policy, 1979, vol. 3, issue 2, 116-125

Abstract: The affiliation agreement has historically been the mechanism through which television networks in the USA have solidified their power, erected barriers to entry for new networks, and taken over control of prime-time programming. While the FCC has modified certain contract terms, local affiliates still clear a staggering amount of network programmes. The central issue for public policy analysis is what can be done to take advantage of the economies of scale of networking without the accompanying side effects on new entry and programming decisions. The author explores what might happen if programme-by-programme bidding were substituted for the affiliation agreement.

Date: 1979
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