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CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

Carlo Cambini, Sara De Masi, Andrea Paci and Laura Rondi

Telecommunications Policy, 2018, vol. 42, issue 6, 474-488

Abstract: This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.

Keywords: Telecom companies; CEO compensation; State ownership; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 J33 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:42:y:2018:i:6:p:474-488