The Federal Communications Commission's rural infrastructure auction: What is hidden in the weeds?

Victor Glass and Timothy Tardiff

Telecommunications Policy, 2019, vol. 43, issue 8, -

Abstract: •Examines reverse auction designed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to fund deployment of broadband infrastructure in high-cost, mainly rural areas.•Describes key decisions about the auction's design.•Contains summary tables and an econometric model that describe results.•Suggests future uses for reverse auctions.

Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596119300321
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:telpol:v:43:y:2019:i:8:7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30471/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... /30471/bibliographic

DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2019.04.005

Access Statistics for this article

Telecommunications Policy is currently edited by Erik Bohlin

More articles in Telecommunications Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().