The Federal Communications Commission's rural infrastructure auction: What is hidden in the weeds?
Victor Glass and
Telecommunications Policy, 2019, vol. 43, issue 8, -
•Examines reverse auction designed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to fund deployment of broadband infrastructure in high-cost, mainly rural areas.•Describes key decisions about the auction's design.•Contains summary tables and an econometric model that describe results.•Suggests future uses for reverse auctions.
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