The moral hazard of Lax FCC land use oversight for advanced network infrastructure

Benjamin W. Cramer

Telecommunications Policy, 2022, vol. 46, issue 1

Abstract: This article discusses issues that arise when service providers place network equipment on publicly owned lands in the United States. Based on land use policy at the Federal Communications Commission, this paper theorizes that the use of public lands for 5G network development will create a moral hazard, as service providers may be tempted to take risks in the way they use public lands. Per economic theory the firm could behave recklessly when knowing that the costs will be borne by someone else – in this case local citizens. This is an example of the moral hazard problem in economics.

Keywords: Telecommunications policy; Land use; 5G; Moral hazard; Principal-agent problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2021.102232

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