COMSAT Presidential directors: Promise and performance

Vincent Mosco

Telecommunications Policy, 1981, vol. 5, issue 4, 251-264

Abstract: The author considers the legislative history and precedents for the selection of COMSAT Presidential directors. Evidence is presented suggesting that Presidential appointees have made a contribution similar to that of stockholder and common carrier directors. This similarity in performance and attitude raises questions about how well the provision has lived up to Congressional intent, particularly in light of the company's own statements and recent ventures into competitive marketplaces. The author concludes that two basic options are available for reform of the Presidential director provision- elimination of the provision or the establishment of specific duties that Presidential directors must fulfil. Moreover, the tendency to uphold the stockholder interest over any other would be remedied by appointing Presidential directors from a wider range of backgrounds.

Date: 1981
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