 Strategies for cross-border travel supply chains: Gaming chinese group tours to TaiwanRuey-Chyn Tsaur and Chyoug-Hwa Chen Tourism Management, 2018, vol. 64, issue C, 154-169 Abstract: In examining the relationship between tour group operators and reception travel agencies, an in-depth mathematical decomposition of product price structure is a key process in understanding its dynamic interactions. There are strategic positions regarding the imbalance between tour group and reception travel agencies, and fierce competition is recorded within the destination market. We construct a cross-border travel supply chain model and derive the influence of commission, reception fee, and administrative cost. An inadequate combination of these factors will lead to zero-commission tours. However, punitive and leadership countermeasures to the prisoner's dilemma for reception operators can be achieved not only from their own and management's self-disciplinary agreements by the destination authority, but also from support and actions under a consensus covering both group organizers and destinations. We provide strategic implications along with Taiwanese empirical evidence, and provide a reference and foundation for other destinations regarding market price-quantity simulations and strategic options. Keywords: Chinese outbound market; Zero-commission tours; Prisoner's dilemma; Tourism supply chain; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:touman:v:64:y:2018:i:c:p:154-169 DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2017.08.011 Access Statistics for this article Tourism Management is currently edited by Chris Ryan More articles in Tourism Management from Elsevier |
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