Airport slots: Can regulation be coordinated with competition? Evidence from Dublin airport

Cathal Guiomard

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2018, vol. 114, issue PA, 127-138

Abstract: Slot regulations have implications for airport efficiency and for competition in aviation; this paper analyses the relationship between slot regulation and aviation competition drawing on the experience of the application of the EU slot rules at Dublin airport. It concludes the best way to promote competition in aviation is to avoid choosing an administrative basis of slot allocation, especially when a new airport is being developed, opting instead for market-compatible mechanisms, whether slot trading or runway charges that are differentiated by scarcity value.

Keywords: Airports; Airlines; Slot regulation; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856416304104
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transa:v:114:y:2018:i:pa:p:127-138

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional
https://shop.elsevie ... _01_ooc_1&version=01

DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2017.09.028

Access Statistics for this article

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice is currently edited by John (J.M.) Rose

More articles in Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().