 Who are more likely to break the rule of congestion charging? Evidence from an active scheme with no referendum votingMilad Mehdizadeh and Afshin Shariat-Mohaymany Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2020, vol. 135, issue C, 63-79 Abstract: Although previous studies have explored predictors of Congestion Charging (CC) acceptability and acceptance, there is no study investigating the rule-breaking behaviour towards a CC scheme. The current study thus examined the effects of a wide range of attitudinal factors as well as demographic, socioeconomic, built environment and travel-related characteristics on rule-breaking/following behaviour towards an ongoing CC scheme. Our major contribution to the state of the art is threefold: (a) we reveal the extent to which citizens break the rule of an active scheme and illegally drive through the CC area, (b) we simultaneously test the relative roles of several latent attitudinal and observed variables in the type of rule-breaking/following conduct in an integrated framework through developing a hybrid choice model, and (c) we empirically investigate how and to what extent the level of legitimacy of an active CC scheme appears in a city in the Middle East context, where politicians have neglected the direct participation of public via referendum voting in the policy process behind the introduction of the CC. A sample of car users was recruited during February and March 2019 in Tehran. A cross-sectional design using a self-report questionnaire survey was conducted. Out of 622 citizens participated in this study, 595 valid observations were used for analysis. Our findings showed significant difference between predictors for those frequently (mono-rule breakers) broke and those who rarely or occasionally (multi rule-breakers) broke the rule of CC. The finding also revealed that latent attitudinal factors could have greater impacts on rule-breaking behaviour than observed variables. Lack of trust in government concerning final use of CC revenues and a lower perceived effectiveness of the CC had the strongest influence on the probability of violating the CC rule. We suggested both short and long-term policies to deal with the issues of legitimacy and survival of the CC scheme. With regard to short-term policy, using media and social networks, the issue of complexity and lack of information about the charging system need to be well-addressed. Considering long-term policy, entrusting management system from governmental authorities to a private system as well as launching environmental campaigns could increase the public trust and effectiveness of the CC scheme, respectively. Keywords: Congestion charging; Rule-breaking behaviour; Referendum voting; Hybrid choice model; Road pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transa:v:135:y:2020:i:c:p:63-79 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2020.03.008 Access Statistics for this article Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice is currently edited by John (J.M.) Rose More articles in Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice from Elsevier |
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