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A risk-based game model for rational inspections in port state control

Zhisen Yang, Zaili Yang, Jingbo Yin and Zhuohua Qu

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2018, vol. 118, issue C, 477-495

Abstract: This paper analyses the game relationship between port authorities and ship owners under the new inspection regime (NIR). Based on 49328 inspection reports from Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (2015-2017), we present a Bayesian Network (BN) model to determine vessel detention rates after adding company performance as a new indicator in PSC inspection. A strategic game model is formulated by incorporating the BN model outcomes. The optimal inspection rate from the game model can help improve port authority performance in PSC. An empirical study is conducted to illustrate the insights of the results and provide suggestions for port authorities.

Keywords: Port state control; Game theory; Bayesian network; Nash solution; NIR; Maritime safety; Maritime risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:118:y:2018:i:c:p:477-495