Auction pricing of network access for North American railways
Steven Harrod
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2013, vol. 49, issue 1, 176-189
Abstract:
The question of pricing train paths for “open access” railway networks in North America is discussed. An auction process is suggested as necessary to maintain transparency in the contracting process. Multiple random samples of auction pricing for a single track railway line demonstrate that the infrastructure entity will receive approximately 15.6% less than the true value of the contracted train paths. This loss of revenue threatens the objective of reducing government subsidy for the railway network.
Keywords: Railway scheduling; Timetabling; Pricing; Train pathing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transe:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:176-189
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DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2012.08.003
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