 Vertical collusion between airports and airlines: An empirical test for the European caseCristina Barbot, D’Alfonso, Tiziana, Paolo Malighetti and Renato Redondi Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2013, vol. 57, issue C, 3-15 Abstract: We develop a test for vertical collusion between airports and airlines in the case of two different scenarios. In the first scenario there is one airport and one airline; this intends to depict the case of airports that do not compete with any other one. In the second, we consider two competing airports and one airline that uses the airport as a base or a hub. In the case of non competing airports we find that gross margins are lower when there is vertical collusion. In the case of competing airports, we find that gross margins are equal when both pairs collude or do not collude. But in the case in which only one pair colludes, a merger between them brings a lower margin. We tested 36 pairs of airports–airlines in the case of non competing airports and we find evidence for vertical collusion with respect to: (i) main national carriers in small airports (ii) low cost carriers in secondary airports. Keywords: Vertical collusion; Airport competition; Airline competition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transe:v:57:y:2013:i:c:p:3-15 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2013.01.002 Access Statistics for this article Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is currently edited by W. Talley More articles in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review from Elsevier |
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