Stable vessel-cargo matching in dry bulk shipping market with price game mechanism
Zixuan Peng,
Wenxuan Shan,
Feng Guan and
Bin Yu
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 76-94
Abstract:
This paper proposes a model of stable vessel-cargo matching with price game mechanism in the dry bulk shipping market. The research aims at mimicking the bid of disadvantaged participants in the process of matching preferred objects. The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated between the shippers and carriers. A price game mechanism based Gale-Shapley algorithm is developed. Three scenarios of market dominated by shippers, market dominated by carriers, and equilibrium market are discussed in computational experiments. It is showed that if disadvantaged participants bid with the price game mechanism, they may gain more surpluses even in the negative position.
Keywords: Price game; Carrier; Shipper; Stable matching; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:76-94
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DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2016.08.007
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