 Are individual preferences always a legitimate basis for evaluating the costs and benefits of public policy?: The case of road traffic law enforcementRune Elvik Transport Policy, 2006, vol. 13, issue 5, 379-385 Abstract: This paper discusses if it is appropriate to include the benefits that offenders get by violating the law in cost-benefit analyses of police enforcement, in the form of a loss of benefits from violations. The discussion is cast in the context of traffic law violations, a very common type of crime, which is usually not very strongly condemned from a moral point of view. Three options for cost-benefit analysis of traffic police enforcement are compared. The three options differ with respect to the treatment of (a) violator benefits from violations, and (b) outlays for traffic tickets given to violators. The implications of the choice of option are shown by means of four case illustrations, all referring to different types of traffic police enforcement in Norway. It is shown that every type of enforcement becomes less cost-effective when violator benefits are included in cost-benefit analyses. The legitimacy of including violator benefits as a benefit to society is discussed. It is concluded that, as far as traffic violations are concerned, benefits obtained by committing violations of the law cannot be treated as a legitimate societal benefit. Date: 2006 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:trapol:v:13:y:2006:i:5:p:379-385 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Transport Policy is currently edited by Y. Hayashi More articles in Transport Policy from Elsevier |
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