Port capacity-sharing decisions in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era

Gang Dong, Masahiro Ishii, Shiyuan Zheng, Koichiro Tezuka and Paul Tae-Woo Lee

Transport Policy, 2024, vol. 147, issue C, 22-31

Abstract: Considering the disruption risk and congestion deterioration caused by recurrent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several ports, this study developed a port capacity decision three-stage game model by adopting a sharing approach, which comprised a combined port management committee and a two-port system. The former determines the capacity-sharing rate, and the latter sequentially chooses its terminal handling charge (THC). Through backward induction, the capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extrema are derived, and then the “siphon effect” and “spillover effect” of capacity-sharing are analyzed. A case study of Shanghai and Ningbo Zhoushan Ports is presented to further illustrate the findings.

Keywords: Port capacity; Sharing decision; Siphon effect; Spillover effect; Three-stage game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:trapol:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:22-31

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DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2023.09.016

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