 Standing in cost-benefit analysis of road safety measures: A case of speed enforcement vs. speed changeKnut Veisten, Christian Stefan and Martin Winkelbauer Transport Policy, 2013, vol. 30, issue C, 269-274 Abstract: Elvik (2006) discussed the appropriateness of including the benefits that offenders get when violating traffic laws. While concluding that these benefits could not be given standing, Elvik resorted to argumentation from normative theories outside the schools of economic theory. In this article, we present arguments for omitting violators' benefits, or lost benefits, based on normative stands within economics school of thought. By means of two examples, we illustrate the distinction between a project of increased/improved enforcement of existing speed limits, where violators' time losses should not be included – compatible with Elvik's point of view – and a project of reduced speed limits, where the time loss should be included. This clarification of standing in cost-benefit analysis of road safety measures is based on the economics school of thought, where cost-benefit analysis is regarded as a decision tool operating within social constraints and where speed limits are considered as absolute institutions. Keywords: Absolute institutions; Neo-classical economic theory; Social constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:trapol:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:269-274 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2013.09.015 Access Statistics for this article Transport Policy is currently edited by Y. Hayashi More articles in Transport Policy from Elsevier |
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