A theoretical study on yardstick competition and franchise bidding based on a dynamic model
Shumpei Harada and
Transport Policy, 2018, vol. 62, issue C, 58-62
This study develops a dynamic model based on the static model of Harada and Yamauchi (2014), which compares yardstick competition with franchise bidding.
Keywords: Yardstick competition; Franchise bidding; Collusion; Dynamic model; Hidden action; Hidden information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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