 Introducing and testing a game-theoretic model for a lottery-based metering system in Minneapolis, United StatesRafael Olarte and Ali Haghani Transport Policy, 2018, vol. 62, issue C, 63-78 Abstract: This paper is part of an ongoing research that analyzes the feasibility of implementing “buyout” auctions for metering traffic inflow at special use lanes (such as high-occupancy/toll lanes). The term “buyout” refers to the fact that these games allow skipping the auction by paying a price. The ongoing research suggests that high consideration needs to be put on the road design before developing a game-theoretic model. It also suggests that from an operations point of view, if a “buyout lottery” system can be implemented successfully, then its conversion to a buyout auction system becomes straightforward. Therefore, this paper aims at: (1) testing a buyout lottery-based metering (LBM) system in a real case scenario, and (2) introducing a game-theoretic model that recommends to its users the strategy to adopt when deciding between paying the toll or playing the lottery. Keywords: Toll; Lottery; Auction; Metering; Risk-averse; Managed lanes (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:trapol:v:62:y:2018:i:c:p:63-78 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.03.007 Access Statistics for this article Transport Policy is currently edited by Y. Hayashi More articles in Transport Policy from Elsevier |
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