The benefits of cooperative policies for transportation network protection from sea level rise: A case study of the San Francisco Bay Area

Samer Michel Madanat, Ilia Papakonstantinou and Jinwoo Lee

Transport Policy, 2019, vol. 76, issue C, A1-A9

Abstract: This research investigates the influence of decision-maker behavior on policies that are likely to be adopted for the protection of highway infrastructure against inundations resulting from sea level rise. We analyze two different types of games to represent decision-maker behavior, and use the San Francisco Bay Area shoreline with a scenario of a 0.5 m sea level rise as a case study, which is expected in 2054. In our model, the objective of the decision-makers (the counties bordering the SF Bay Area) is to minimize the traffic delay caused by inundations in the transportation network that lies in the geographical boundaries of their counties.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Cooperative games; Sea level rise; Protection of shoreline infrastructure; Transportation networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2018.12.011

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