 Cooperation with a vessel transfer policy for coopetition among container terminals in a single portChathumi Ayanthi Kavirathna, Tomoya Kawasaki, Shinya Hanaoka and Yapa Bandara Transport Policy, 2020, vol. 89, issue C, 1-12 Abstract: This paper discusses the effects of the cooperation among terminal operators in a single port as a part of their coopetition strategy in order to increase overall port competitiveness by minimizing vessel traffic congestion and berthing delays at terminals. A mixed-integer programming model is formulated incorporating game-theoretical decision-making, and then tested with the Port of Colombo, Sri Lanka. The results show that depending on the terminals' objectives, namely “minimizing total penalty cost” and “maximizing total profit,” cooperation among terminals in the operation stage reduces berthing delays and increases terminal utilization than in the status quo, where terminals do not cooperate in the operation stages. This paper discusses policy recommendations to increase the effectiveness of vessel transfers, while also considering the port authority's policies toward enforcing penalty charges for berthing delays and collecting terminal fees from concession terminals. Keywords: Vessel transfer policy; Coopetition; Cooperation; Port competitiveness; Berthing delays (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:trapol:v:89:y:2020:i:c:p:1-12 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2020.01.010 Access Statistics for this article Transport Policy is currently edited by Y. Hayashi More articles in Transport Policy from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.