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How do different payment schemes to operators affect public transport concessions? A microeconomic model

Juan Pablo Sepúlveda and Patricia Galilea

Transport Policy, 2020, vol. 93, issue C, 27-35

Abstract: In many large cities worldwide, private companies operate public transport systems under concession contracts granted by the local governments. The performance of these concessions, including the quality of service and amount of subsidy, is often an issue of public debate. In this context, a major factor that determines performance is the concession contract. Payment mechanisms (established in the contract) influence the operator's decisions by providing certain incentives. Therefore, it is important to study the effects of the payment mechanism on the performance of the transport system.

Keywords: Contracts; Public transport; Concessions; Bus operators; Incentives; Economic modelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R41 R42 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2020.04.016

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