 Informal Groups and Health Insurance Take-up Evidence from a Field ExperimentWorld Development, 2018, vol. 101, issue C, 54-72 Abstract: This paper presents the results of 20 randomized experiments aimed at understanding the low take-up of in-patient health insurance observed in developing countries. Take-up does not increase when participants receive information about the product, or an assistance to register, or small subsidies of 2, 10, or 30%. Take-up does not increase when the same information is provided by local respected community leaders, when participants are offered an in-kind gift (a chicken) if they register, when participants are offered the possibility to contribute lower and more frequent payments, or the possibility to pay by cellphone. A full subsidy generates a mere 45% take-up (with no retention after one year). In contrast to these low take-up rates, presenting the same information without any subsidies to existing informal groups raises take-up to 12% (still 7% after one year), as well as trust and knowledge of the product. Social networks play a major role in the adoption of health insurance. This paper provides a cost-effective way to increase take-up of health insurance, while subsidies are found to be largely ineffective at raising take-up in the long run. Keywords: health insurance; informal groups (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:54-72 DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.08.001 Access Statistics for this article World Development is currently edited by O. T. Coomes More articles in World Development from Elsevier |
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