Electoral incentives to combat mosquito-borne illnesses: Experimental evidence from Brazil

Taylor C. Boas and F. Daniel Hidalgo

World Development, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 89-99

Abstract: Mosquito-borne illnesses present significant health challenges to the developing world. If citizens are informed about their government’s efforts to combat these diseases, will they reward incumbents who have performed well and punish those who have done poorly at this task? Electoral sanctioning requires that combatting disease be a sufficiently salient concern, which, in turn, is likely to depend upon subjective perceptions of the risks posed by particular illnesses. Epidemics typically prompt stronger risk perceptions than endemic diseases, but where both types circulate jointly, the more familiar endemic disease may determine public reactions. The salience of health threats also varies among individuals; those with a self-interest in prevention or a personal connection to the effects of mosquito-borne illnesses may react more strongly.

Keywords: Latin America; Brazil; Elections; Accountability; Epidemic disease (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:89-99

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.013

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