 Political competition, fiscal policy, and economic performance in techno-creative placesAmitrajeet Batabyal, Karima Kourtit and Peter Nijkamp World Development, 2025, vol. 188, issue C Abstract: This paper introduces a model of political competition under distinct institutional regimes to trace the economic performance of what we call “techno-creative places.” Specifically, we analyze how political competition in high-tech places that are creative in the sense of Richard Florida affects fiscal (tax) policy and consequent economic outcomes. There are three stylized groups of actors in our analysis: laborers or workers, techno-creative class members or entrepreneurs, and the elites who make the political decisions. We study two broad institutional-economic scenarios. In the first (second) scenario, the likelihood of political power shifting permanently from the elites to entrepreneurs is an increasing (decreasing) function of the net income of a representative techno-creative entrepreneur. Our study addresses the institutional implications of both scenarios and then comments on the implications of these two scenarios for the welfare of the elites and the techno-creative entrepreneurs. Keywords: Techno-Creative Class; Elite; Entrepreneur; Political Competition; Tax Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:188:y:2025:i:c:s0305750x24003528 DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106881 Access Statistics for this article World Development is currently edited by O. T. Coomes More articles in World Development from Elsevier |
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