Peer Monitoring, Social Ties and Moral Hazard in Group Lending Programs: Evidence from Eritrea

Niels Hermes (), Robert Lensink and Habteab T. Mehrteab

World Development, 2005, vol. 33, issue 1, 149-169

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Working Paper: Peer monitoring, social ties and moral hazard in group lending programmes: evidence from Eritrea (2003)
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