Political Market Characteristics and the Provision of Educational Infrastructure in North India

Benjamin Crost and Uma Kambhampati

World Development, 2010, vol. 38, issue 2, 195-204

Abstract: Summary In this paper, we are concerned with the provision of schools in rural North India, particularly with whether such provision is determined by the demographic and economic characteristics of the region or whether local democracy also plays a role. We find that the probability that a governing party loses an election has a positive effect on the provision of schooling infrastructure, while the margin of victory of the governing party has a negative effect. Political reservation for members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) has a positive effect on schooling infrastructure in villages with a large SC population, but a negative effect overall.

Keywords: schooling; India; public; goods; political; economy; political; competition; caste (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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