Do Spouses Make Claims? Empowerment and Microfinance in India

Ashok Rai and Shamika Ravi

World Development, 2011, vol. 39, issue 6, 913-921

Abstract: Summary We study a microfinance program that provides compulsory health insurance to its borrowers and their spouses. We find that non-borrowing spouses are less likely to file insurance claims than those who are borrowing. Further, a man is more likely to use the health insurance acquired through his wife's loan than is a woman (through her husband's loan). These patterns suggest that women who do not borrow are disempowered relative to those who do.

Keywords: health; insurance; microfinance; claims; gender; empowerment; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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