Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities

Ulf Narloch, Unai Pascual () and Adam G. Drucker

World Development, 2012, vol. 40, issue 10, 2096-2107

Abstract: This paper explores the potential effects of external reward systems on conservation behavior by accounting for their interactions with patterns of collective action. In order to simulate such dynamics, we conducted framed field experiments in farming communities from the Bolivian and Peruvian Andes. These game-based simulation exercises were framed around agrobiodiversity conservation decisions the participating farmers were very familiar with. We find that collective rewards could be ineffective and crowd-out social norms. Promisingly though, individual rewards appear to increase conservation levels through a crowding-in effect that stabilizes collective action.

Keywords: cooperation; payments for ecosystem services; social norms; Andes; Bolivia; Peru (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (78)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:10:p:2096-2107

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.03.014

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