EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing: Evidence from a Field Lab in Rural Tanzania

D’Exelle, Ben, Els Lecoutere () and Bjorn Van Campenhout
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ben D'Exelle

World Development, 2012, vol. 40, issue 12, 2537-2551

Abstract: This article studies how users of scarce common water resources deal with equity-efficiency trade-offs. For this purpose, we conduct a field lab experiment in Tanzania that simulates the distribution of irrigation water between upstream and downstream users. We find a strong preference for equal sharing even if this comes with large foregone efficiency gains. However, we also find indications that efficiency considerations are taken into account. (Selfish) deviations from equal sharing are more likely implemented when they are efficiency-enhancing. Finally, we detect a tendency to alternate between altruistic and selfish sharing, which reconciles equity and efficiency considerations.

Keywords: equity-efficiency trade-offs; egalitarian norms; distribution of irrigation water; field lab experiment; Tanzania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X12001489
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:12:p:2537-2551

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.05.026

Access Statistics for this article

World Development is currently edited by O. T. Coomes

More articles in World Development from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nithya Sathishkumar ().

 
Page updated 2021-05-14
Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:12:p:2537-2551