Partisan Preferences and Skill Formation Policies: New Evidence from Turkey and Argentina

Fulya Apaydin

World Development, 2012, vol. 40, issue 8, 1522-1533

Abstract: Following a switch to export-oriented industrialization, reorganization of production in the automobile industry demanded a new worker profile in developing economies like Turkey and Argentina. Yet, the process of transforming worker skills unfolded differently across industrial clusters. The paper explains this variation by highlighting formal political dynamics at the sub-national level. It finds that when local politicians have limited fiscal capacities, they are compelled to build partisan coalitions to advance industrial reform policies. Evidence from Bursa (Turkey), Istanbul (Turkey), and Córdoba (Argentina) shows that under these circumstances, governors who mobilize partisan loyalties can resolve disputes between business and labor, while others who are unable to do so cannot implement the proposed changes.

Keywords: skill formation; industrial policy; local politics; Turkey; Argentina (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:8:p:1522-1533

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.006

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