Electoral Competition and Local Government Responsiveness in Brazil

Paulo Arvate

World Development, 2013, vol. 43, issue C, 67-83

Abstract: The empirical literature on the effects of competition on the supply of public goods shows controversial results at the local level. The main objective of this paper is to investigate this relationship in a federalist country (Brazil) where the political system places few barriers to the entry of competitors and local governments have the independence to establish their own public policy. We show that a higher effective number of candidates running for the executive branch increase the supply of local public goods (the number of student enrollments, teachers, and free immunizations).

Keywords: Political competition; Supply of public goods; Local governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:43:y:2013:i:c:p:67-83

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.11.004

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