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Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Stephen Knack and Lodewijk Smets

World Development, 2013, vol. 44, issue C, 63-76

Abstract: This study analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of aid fragmentation on donors’ decisions to tie their development aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Building on collective action theory, it argues that a donor with a larger share of the aid market in a country has stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of its aid, by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the prediction that higher donor aid shares will be associated with less aid tying. This finding is robust to recipient controls, donor fixed effects, and instrumental variables estimation. Furthermore, it contradicts other studies suggesting that when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more of their aid.

Keywords: aid; development assistance; collective action; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:44:y:2013:i:c:p:63-76

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.09.006

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