Can Poor Countries Lobby for More US Bilateral Aid?

Gabriel Montes-Rojas ()

World Development, 2013, vol. 44, issue C, 77-87

Abstract: This article explores if countries can lobby the US government for the allocation of US bilateral foreign aid. We consider an informational lobby model where lobbying has two effects. First, a direct effect by informing US policymakers about their countries’ needs. Second, an indirect effect on policymakers by informing them about common interests in economic or geopolitical terms. The lobbyist thus influences the decisions about the allocation of aid resources. We estimate the effect of the recipient country’s lobbying agents in obtaining foreign aid. The econometric results show that lobbying positively affects the amount of bilateral aid received.

Keywords: foreign aid; lobbying; interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:44:y:2013:i:c:p:77-87

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.006

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